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Religious Nationalism and the Palestinian-Israeli
Conflict: Examining Hamas and
the Possibility of Reform*
Sara Roy**
Is the transformation of Hamas-the largest political faction in the
Palestinian Islamic movement-possible?' For many, perhaps most, observers
and analysts of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict the answer is an immediate and
unequivocal "no," particularly in light of the many horrific suicide bombing
attacks perpetrated by Hamas against Israeli civilians since the start of the al
Aqsa Intifada over three years ago. Yet, recent history has shown that internal
change within Hamas is indeed possible, and perhaps under the right conditions,
sustainable. History has also shown Hamas to be pragmatic, flexible, and open
to change.
There is no doubt that in the five years or so prior to the start of the
current uprising, the Islamists-particularly Hamas-had entered a period of deradicalization and demilitarization and were searching for political and social
accommodation within Palestinian society. There was a pronounced shift in
emphasis within the movement away from political/military action toward
social/cultural reform, and political violence was slowly but steadily being
abandoned as a form of resistance and as a strategy for defeating the occupier.
The shift toward the social realm-and retreat from the political-was dramatic,
and by the admission of the Islamist leadership itself, reflected, more than
anything, the successful weakening by Israel and the Palestinian Authority
This article emanates from a project supported by a grant from the Research and Writing Initiative
of the Program on Global Security and Sustainability of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation. Major sections of this article first appeared in Sara Roy, Hamas and the TranoVormation(s)
of PolticalIslam in Palestine, 102 Current Hist 13 (Jan 2003). Reprinted here with permission. Certain
of the findings and quotes in this article are based on the author's fieldwork on the Palestinian
Islamic movement, carried out in 1999.
Senior Research Scholar, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University.
Certain terms need to be defined: "Islamic movement" refers not only to its political sector, in
which Hamas predominates, but to the social, cultural, and religious sectors of the movement
which may or may not have direct links to the political; "Islamist movement" refers to the Islamic
political sector in Palestine.
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("PA") of the Islamic political sector and the defeat of its military wing. The
thrust toward the social arena, furthermore, was not simply a return to old forms
of social service provision commonly associated with the Islamic movement, but
included entry into new areas of community and development work that pointed
to an emerging new logic between state and society.2
The al Aqsa Intifada, which began in September 2000 in response to seven
years of a "peace" process that not only deepened Palestinian dispossession and
deprivation but strengthened Israel's occupation, reversed the dramatic changes
within the Islamic movement. The militarization of the uprising by Fateh, the
dominant (secular) nationalist faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization
("PLO"), effectively marginalized the role of civil society-including both
secular and Islamic institutions-in the struggle to end Israeli occupation. This
contributed to the re-ascendance of the political/military sector as the defining
and authoritative component within the Islamic movement. Israel's continued
and increasingly brutal assault against Palestinian society and its economy and
the deliberate destruction of its civic institutions have only strengthened the
embrace of the military option by Palestinians, including the Islamists. Despite
this, the social core of the Islamic movement remains strong and has become an
increasingly important part of the Palestinian social welfare system, given
dramatically heightened levels of unemployment and poverty and the PA's
diminished capacity to deliver even the most basic services.
This Article will briefly examine the main political and social
transformations in the Islamic movement both before and since the current
uprising, about which relatively little is known.' While certain key dynamics
within the movement (for example, an emphasis on the delivery of social
services) have remained largely unchanged, others (such as the strengthening and
dominance of the PA and the weakening-cum-silencing of the Islamists) are
being replaced with some altogether new dynamics that portend damaging
consequences for Palestinian society and for a political resolution of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This examination will refer only to Hamas, since it is
the largest and most influential of the Islamist parties.
I. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ISLAM DURING THE OSLO PERIOD
(SEPTEMBER 1993-SEPTEMBER 2000)
Hamas, or the Movement of the Islamic Resistance (Harakatal-muqawama
al-islamiyya), was formalized with the Palestinian uprising, or Intifada, in
December 1987. The birth of this organization represented the Palestinian
2

See Sara Roy, The Traniformationof Islamic NGOs in Palestine, 214 Middle East Rep 24 (Spring 2000),
in which some of the findings described herein were first presented.
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embodiment of political Islam in the Middle East. Hamas's evolution and
influence were due primarily to the first Palestinian Intifada and the ways in
which Hamas participated in the uprising-through the operations of its military
wing, the work of its political leadership and its social activities.
Hamas's goals, a nationalist position couched in religious discourse, are
articulated in Hamas's key documents: a charter, political memoranda, and
communiques. Some of these documents are undeniably racist and dogmatic,
calling for the liberation of Palestine from the Mediterranean to the Jordan
River. Yet later documentation, particularly since the mid-1990s, is less
doctrinaire and depicts the struggle as a form of resistance to an occupying
power-as a struggle over land and its usurpation, and over how to end the
occupation. Statements by key Hamas officials over the last two years in
particular maintain that their goals are Israel's withdrawal from lands occupied in
the 1967 war, the end of Israeli occupation, the establishment of a Palestinian
state, and a solution to the refugee issue.4
During the years of the Oslo peace process, the political and military
sectors of the Islamic movement, in which Hamas predominates, were
substantially weakened by a combination of factors. Most significant was the
sustained intense pressure-arrests, imprisonment, execution-imposed by
Israel and the Palestinian Authority, which successfully weakened the
organization from within. In addition, these same pressures were imposed on
Islamic social institutions, the so-called "terrorist infrastructure," which resulted
in the closing down of many charitable societies (some of which later reopened.)
This pattern continues to this day. In this way (and in others), Yasir Arafat did a
great deal to promote Israel's policy objectives. Not only did he undermine
Islamist (Hamas and Islamic Jihad notably) organizations, he weakened
Palestinian civil society and the Palestinian leadership structure. This was termed
"liberalization" by supporters of the Oslo process, a liberalization that not only
preceded democracy but also precluded it.
Another critical factor was the Palestinian population itself, the mass base
of support for Hamas, who could no longer tolerate extremism in any form. The
economic costs of Hamas's military operations and terrorist attacks became too
high in an eroding socioeconomic environment, and widespread popular
opposition to such attacks played an important role in ending them. The
defection of younger Hamas cadres, disillusioned by the failure of their
leadership to achieve any meaningful political change, further contributed to

4

See Abd al-Aziz Rantisi, et al, Inteniewsfmm Gaza: What Hamas Wants, 9 Middle East Poly 102 (Dec
2002); Seumas Milne, Too Late for Two States?, Guardian (London) 16 (an 24, 2004); and
International Crisis Group, Dealing with Hamas, ICG Middle East Rep No 21 (Jan 26, 2004),
available online at <http://www.crisisweb.org//brary/documents/middle-east northafrica
/21- dealingwith_hamas.pdf> (visited Mar 28, 2004).
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Hamas's decline. Similarly, the Islamic political sector was further weakened by
Arafat's successful co-optation of some parts of that sector in the form of newly
established Islamic parties or groups (for example, the National Islamic
Salvation Party, the National Movement for Change, the Islamic Struggle
Movement) under the control of the Authority. These groups (especially the
National Islamic Salvation Party)-the non-violent embodiment of Palestinian
Islamism-were (unsuccessfully) to represent Islamist interests in domestic and
international political forums. Apparently, there were no relations between these
groups and Hamas (or the Islamic Jihad). Despite the fact that such co-optation
was meant to divide and weaken Hamas, it also reflected Arafat's "preference for
dialogue over head-on collision," which Hamas also preferred since neither actor
wanted to risk their public legitimacy in a confrontation.5
Another factor that contributed to Hamas's internal malaise was growing
popular alienation from politics, perhaps especially from political Islam, in favor
of cultural and religious practice, and a desire to return to the ethical and moral
traditions of Islam. This alienation was no doubt deepened by the absence of
any alternative political channels of expression. Moreover, with the end of the
Intifada and the initiation of the Oslo peace process, the resistance component
of the Palestinian struggle-so critical to Hamas's political thinking and actionwas undermined. This had direct repercussions for Hamas's social theory and
practice, which were largely if not wholly developed and shaped by the praxis of
resistance during the uprising. For Hamas, there is an inextricable link between
social and political action traceable to its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood.6
With the removal of the resistance/opposition component from Palestinian
political imperatives, what role-at least one acceptable to the majority of
Palestinians-was left for Hamas? The resulting problem confronting Hamas
(and the Islamic movement generally) was fundamentally one of survival. How,
in light of its own internal weakness and political constraints, could Hamas
remain the primary opposition force capable of mobilizing popular support?
In response (and despite the fact that many in the Islamic political sector
remained active and fully committed to political and military action), there was a
steady shift in emphasis, both ideologically and strategically, to the social sector
of the Islamic movement, which had always been a critical component of that
movement, providing a range of important services and doing so effectively.
This shift was, in effect, a search for accommodation and consensus within the
status quo, and it also reflected the concept of the "living reality" and the need
for Islamists to adjust to the conditions of the country in which they live.

5

6

Shaul Mishal, The Pragmatic Dimension of the Palestinian Hamas: A Network Perpective, 29 Armed
Forces & Socy 569, 580 (2003).
The Muslim Brotherhood was a movement of political Islam committed to building an Islamic
society by applying Islamic law. It was founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna.

Vol5 No 1

Religious Naionalismand the Palestinian-IsraeliConflict

Strategically, Hamas, and the Islamic movement generally, attempted to carve
out public space in which they could operate without too much harassment
from the Israeli or Palestinian authorities, and provide much needed services to
an increasingly needy population through a well-developed institutional
infrastructure. In this way, the Islamists could maintain their presence and
influence within Palestinian society. It is also important to point out that the
core impulse within Hamas is political, not religious; indeed, religion has never
dominated politics among Palestinian Islamists, and Hamas typically "does not
subordinate its activities and decisions to the officially held religious doctrine."7
This fact accounts, in large part, for Hamas's pragmatism, flexibility, and
ideological reflexivity.8
Were there direct ties 'between Islamic political/military and social
institutions? The debate over this question has been vociferous since the birth of
Hamas. Accepted belief argues that Hamas controls all Islamic social institutions
and uses them for political indoctrination and military recruitment. The scope of
this Article does not include a discussion of these interrelationships. Even so, it
can be said that these interrelationships were neither always routine and
guaranteed, as is commonly believed, nor evil where they existed. Some
institutions claimed no political links at all. However, it cannot be denied that
the work of Islamic social institutions, be they aligned or non-aligned, did bolster
the position of Hamas during the time of the first Intifada. In the final analysis,
however, more important than the existence or absence of links was the work of
these institutions and the services they provided.
Interestingly, many members of the Islamic political leadership did not
view the non-aligned sector or the growing dominance of the social sector as a
problem. A senior Hamas official explained it this way: "Everyone who is
religious is Hamas and anyone who teaches Islamic values furthers Hamas's
goals." 9 Thus, the organic interconnection between political and social action in
Hamas's ideology meant that the expansion of the social sector served the
movement's objectives even if social institutions were non-affiliated. Hence,
Hamas's retreat from the political sphere was practical and pragmatic and
accompanied by a need to rediscover Islam and its ethical and moral relevance
for society (similar trends could be found in Egypt as well).
It was increasingly clear, therefore, in the two-to-three year period before
the current uprising, that Hamas was no longer calling in any prominent or
consistent way for political or military action against the occupation but was

7

Mishal, 29 Armed Forces & Socy at 570 (cited in note 5).
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For an interesting account of a similar phenomenon among Islamists in Egypt, see Augustus
Richard Norton, Thwarted Politics: The Case of Egpt's Hizb al-Wasat, in Robert Hefner, ed, Muslim
Democrats:Prospects and Policiesfor a Modem Islamist Poliics (Princeton forthcoming 2004).
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instead shifting its attention to social works and the propagation of Islamic
values and religious practice. According to a key Hamas official at the time:
"Increasingly, Hamas represents religion and an Islamic way of life, not political
violence."'" In fact, concomitant with this shift toward the social/cultural was a
shift in certain terms and ideas, notably, a growing acceptance of civil society as
a concept-of a society where Islamic and Islamist institutions functioned as
part of an integrated whole with their secular counterparts.
There was also a changing definition of the threats facing Palestinian
society. These threats were no longer confined to political or military attacks (by
Israel and the PA) against Palestinian resources but also included cultural
aggression against Palestinian values, beliefs, and practices. Defeating the
occupier, therefore, became a matter of cultural preservation-building a moral
consensus and Islamic value system-as well as political and military power.
Hence, the struggle was not for power per se, but for defining new social
arrangements and appropriate cultural and institutional models that would meet
social needs and do so without violence. The idea was not to create an Islamic
society but a society that was more Islamic as a form of protection against all
forms of aggression. By so doing, the Islamic movement was creating a
discourse of empowerment despite the retreat of its long-dominant political
sector.
Prior to the Oslo period, social action was focused on religious education
through charitable societies, mosques, Zakat committees, health clinics, relief
organizations, orphanages, schools, and various clubs. The objective was to
teach Islamic values and to embody them through practice, specifically through
the provision of social services. Recipients were largely the poor and working
classes. The Islamists gained a reputation for honesty and integrity in the way
they conducted themselves, especially when compared to the PLO. However,
and perhaps most importantly, the shift to social services during the Oslo period
represented more than a return to Islamist and Islamic roots in the Muslim
Brotherhood. This shift was accompanied by entry into seemingly new areas of
social activity or the expansion of activity in pre-existing areas that went beyond
the traditional boundaries of religious education and proselytizing that
historically characterized the social work of the Muslim Brotherhood. This
allowed the Islamists entry to and legitimation by the existing order. The
Islamists certainly appeared to be seeking such legitimation-at the very least,
they passively accepted the new, more respectable status. Although social action
has a political and revolutionary purpose in Hamas's ideology, Islamic social
activism, as it was evolving in the Oslo context, was becoming increasingly
incorporated within the mainstream. This, of course, was one way the ruling
authority controlled the Islamic section, but it worked to the advantage of both.
10
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Some of the clearest examples of this dynamic were found in education, health,
and banking."
In education, for example, Islamic kindergartens, reputed centers of intense
political proselytizing, taught a standard curriculum that was approved by the
Palestinian Ministry of Education. This was also true for new Islamic schools at
the elementary school level. Interestingly, many but not all Islamic schools
taught a religious curriculum, which in a growing number of cases was also
standardized, regulated, and approved by the Ministry of Education. For
instance, one principal in an Islamic school in Gaza commented how impressed
he was by the Ministry's religious curriculum. 12 In fact, the Islamic movement
appears to have strengthened its presence in the education sector. According to
Ministry of Education officials at that time, 65 percent of all Gazan educational
institutions below the secondary level were Islamic (a percentage that has in all
likelihood increased).
Other examples were found in the health care sector with the emergence of
tertiary and highly specialized medical care in Islamic facilities. One of the most
sophisticated hospitals in the West Bank and Gaza is located in Hebron, and was
founded, administered, and financed by the Islamic and Islamist leadership.
Although small hospitals were founded by the Muslim Brotherhood years ago,
they do not compare with the scope of the Hebron facility. Furthermore, an
Islamic facility in Gaza is a highly respected (by the Palestinian medical
establishment) rehabilitation and treatment center for acute spinal cord injuries.
There were also initiatives in the economic sector with the establishment of
an Islamic banking network with four Islamic banks and over twenty branches in
the occupied territories, Islamic investment houses, and a range of business
enterprises. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that Hamas had any control, direct
or even indirect, over certain kinds of Islamic economic institutions such as
those in banking and finance given its own limited organizational structure and
the tight regulation of such activities by governmental agencies. In all these
cases, Islamic institutions were working with and were regulated by the
appropriate Palestinian ministries and agencies and, in many cases, had what
appeared to be good working relationships with the governmental sector.
Also important is the fact that people seeking the services of Islamic nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") did so not because they were ideological
supporters of Hamas (or any other Islamist faction) but because they needed the

11 By September 2000, approximately 10-40 percent of all social institutions in the Gaza Strip were
12

Islamic, according to official and private sources.
Field interview conducted by author (1999).
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services.' 3 Accepting the service, furthermore, did not automatically (or
necessarily) translate into political support for the Islamist movement.
Arguably, these expanded new areas of Islamic social activity represented
the normalization, institutionalization, and professionalization of the Islamic
sector in public education, the system of health care delivery, and banking and
finance. Indeed, Islamic social service organizations typically evinced the
following characteristics: the absence of political ideological criteria as conditions
for access to Islamic social services, or for membership in Islamic social
organizations; no commitment to creating a strictly Islamic society or to the
implementation of any Islamic model; a desire for greater practical cooperation
with the Palestinian government, itself reflecting an openness on the part of the
Islamists for better state-society relations, and not an attempt to challenge or
alienate state authority;14 and prioritizing professionalism over ideology. This
steadily legitimized Islam, however slowly, as part of the dominant paradigm. In
fact, the author found that Hamas preferred to operate openly and legally, which
is not unusual for Islamic movements in other states where they are tolerated.
In fact, the Islamic sector was not advancing a policy of isolation but was
calling for greater accommodation and cooperation with national/local and
international actors, including certain counterpart professional institutions in
Israel, the United States Agency for International Development ("USAID"),
European governmental agencies, and United Nations organizations, among
others. In one health care institution in Gaza, for example, which was
considered "Hamas-affiliated" since some members of its management team
were political supporters of the organization, the medical director proudly
described a training program inside Israel to which he sent some of his staff. In
all likelihood, this decision could not have been taken without the sanction of
the Islamic political leadership.
This advocacy for greater social (and perhaps political) integration with
non-Islamic actors, both internal and external, appeared widespread among
officials in the Islamic social sector and was the stated position of some
members of the political leadership. Hence, the work of the Islamic social sector
was not regarded either by its members or beneficiaries as a political battle
against the state. Islamic organizations were judged by their social and economic
performance, not by their political ideology. As such, Hamas's internal shift
arguably represented the beginning of a new ethos of civic engagement, a limited
pluralism as it were. It further points to what Amr Hamzawy, a scholar of
13
14

Prior to the current period there was always a limited if not inchoate Islamist base among
Palestinians.
According to Mishal, "although Hamas propaganda continued to discredit and delegitimize the
PA's leadership, Hamas was careful not to alienate the rank and file within the PA administration."
Mishal, 29 Armed Forces & Socy at 579 (cited in note 5).
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Islamist movements, calls the "inner secularization of the religious discourse" as
a means of adapting to existing social, political, and economic realities.' 5
The shift to social action, to a social (and hence, political) domestic agenda,
to new forms of social engagement and to the normalization, incorporation, and
institutionalization of the Islamic and Islamist agenda during the Oslo period
represented an important change within the Islamist movement and the creation
of a new space in Islamist thinking away from national action and toward
communal development and reformist initiatives. It appeared that Hamas or its
successors were slowly moving away from the political extreme toward a more
centrist position, trying to position themselves between the corruption of the PA
and its donor-linked development projects and violent Islamic militants and the
impossibilities they had come to represent. Islamists, perhaps, were trying to
limit the arbitrary political power of PA not through political or military
confrontation, which had failed and was costly, but through mobilizing people at
the social/cultural level and allowing the social part of the movement (both its
aligned and non-aligned parts) to define, pragmatically and non-violently, the
Islamic and Islamist agenda for some time into the future. And, while the
transformation from militancy to accommodation was not smooth or quick, it
was taking place.
II. THE RE-ASCENDANCE OF POLITICAL ISLAM DURING THE
SECOND INTIFADA: AN END TO ACCOMMODATION?

6

The start of the second Palestinian Intifada on September 28, 2000,
coupled with the impact of September 11, 2001, has dramatically changed the
environment in the West Bank and Gaza. Preexisting political arrangements
have been severely disrupted, economic conditions have declined dramatically,
and key social structures and mediatory institutions have been weakened and, in
some cases, destroyed. Within this context of desperation and hopelessness, the
Islamist opposition, notably Hamas, has reasserted itself.
Several political factors have contributed to the re-ascendance of the
Islamists. Among the most important is the abnegation of any leadership or
command role by the PA during the uprising, and the emergence of a younger
generation of more militant Fateh cadres who assumed leadership of the
uprising early on. The resulting militarization of the Intifada not only
marginalized the role of Palestinian civil society, but also discredited and eclipsed
15
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Rabbani, The Costs of Chaos in Palestine, 224 Middle East Rep 6 (Fall 2002).
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the role of the older generation of PA/PLO elites. Fateh, however, has not been
able to exert control over the PA (itself greatly weakened), the Islamists, or other
factions due in part to the party's own internal divisions and fragmentation. The
political splits within the Palestinian national movement, and the strengthening
of armed and cross-factional militias seeking political power and an end to
occupation through violent confrontation, created the time and space for Hamas
to rebuild its political/military infrastructure and pursue a form of militancy that
went beyond Fateh's own (which until then had confined operations to the
occupied territories). By attacking civilian targets inside Israel-a strategy
subsequently followed by Fateh and others-Hamas not only succeeded in
gaining support from an increasingly desperate population, but also in
undermining the PA. The PA was blamed for the attacks and the diplomatic
initiatives it was pursuing.
Several other factors also contributed to the re-emergence and
strengthening of the Islamists. Yasir Arafat became politically marginalized, and
the Palestinian leadership experienced increasing international isolation, which
was later transformed into an explicit attempt by Israel and the US to affect
"regime change." The politico-military campaign against the Palestinian
Authority resulted in the large-scale destruction of its institutional
infrastructure-including its security forces and leadership/command
structure-and the incapacitation of the PA as a political institution and
administrative apparatus. There is also no common approach to the conflict or a
coherent strategy of resistance, which reflects the lack of a unifying national
liberation movement. Similarly, Palestinian politics have become increasingly
decentralized and political fragmentation is growing, whereby central authority is
steadily ceded to local control. Different factions have implemented (sometimes)
conflicting political strategies (for example, the PA's eroding political/diplomatic
track, Fateh's war of attrition, and the Islamists' larger war) that serve to
perpetuate organizational chaos within the political domain. Furthermore,
several important parties, especially the US, have accepted Israeli Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon's agenda, which seeks to eliminate the PA and preclude the
establishment of a Palestinian state through continued Israeli settlement
expansion, land expropriation, the building of the separation wall, and other
forms of economic dispossession. The US government also has failed to pursue
seriously a political resolution of the conflict, and there is no credible prospect
for a meaningful political settlement.
These factors, among others, have not only catalyzed the formation and
radicalization of the Islamist factions, but have also resulted in a balance of
power that has slowly shifted in these factions' favor. This shift is underlined by
three dynamics-changing popular sentiment, the PA/nationalist-Islamist
relationship, and Israeli policy toward the Islamist opposition.
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A. SHIFTING POPULAR SENTIMENT
Historically, popular support for Hamas and other Islamist factions was
strongest in the perceived absence of political progress, a nationalist barometer
of political discontent. During the period of the peace process, for example,
when Palestinians were hopeful of a political settlement, support for Hamas and
others-never, in the author's view, substantial-waned, and when prospects
dimmed as they did after the failed Camp David Summit in July 2000 support
rose, albeit incrementally. Prior to the current Intifada, political despair did not
translate into support for the Islamists but into losses for the nationalists. After
Camp David, for example, support for Arafat dropped to 47 percent from its
peak of 65 percent in 1996 and support for Fateh declined to 37 percent after
having reached an unprecedented 55 percent in 1996 (when Palestinian support
for the peace process reached 80 percent and support for violent attacks against
Israeli targets dropped to 20 percent). The popularity of the Islamists rose only
from 15 percent in 1996 to 17 percent in 2000.17
Hence, popular desertion of the secular nationalist forces did not translate
into support for the Islamists; instead, people remained uncommitted. However,
this changed during the Intifada: growing economic deprivation and political
failure gradually shifted loyalties to the Islamists. Almost one year into the
current Intifada, Arafat's popularity plummeted to 33 percent and Fateh's to 29
percent.18 By July 2001, the Islamist factions claimed 27 percent of polled
support, which represented an 80 percent increase from 1996.19 Simultaneously,
support for the opposition, both Islamist and nationalist, reached 31 percent,
20
which exceeded that of Fateh and its associates at 30 percent. Yet, during this
same time, it is also important to note that while 61 percent of Palestinians
believed that armed confrontations with Israel helped achieve rights where
negotiations failed, 71 percent supported an immediate return to negotiations
and 73 percent supported reconciliation with Israelis after the establishment of a
Palestinian state recognized by Israel. 21 A year later, in the context of dramatic
economic decline and political disintegration, a Bir Zeit University poll revealed

17

Khalil Shikaki and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (2001) (draft on file with
author).
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Sara Roy, Hamas and the Transformation(s)of PoliticalIslam in Palestine, 102 Current Hist 13, 18 (Jan
2003).
Shikaki and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (cited in note 17).
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Public Opinion Poll #3. Palestinians Support the
Ceasefire, Negotiations, and Reconciliation between the Two Peoples but a Majority Opposes Arrests and Believe
That Armed Confrontations Have Helped Achieve NationalRights (Dec 19-24, 2001), available online at
<http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2001/p3a.html> (visited Mar 28, 2004).
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that 42 percent of Palestinians favored an Islamic state, a finding that was totally
unprecedented."
B. INTERNAL DYNAMICS: THE PA, THE ISLAMISTS, AND THE
SECULAR NATIONALIST FORCES
With the Intifada, the Palestinian political environment underwent some
dramatic changes. First was the restoration of the resistance component and
militancy to the Palestinian struggle, embraced by all factions and not just the
Islamic opposition. Second was the attempt by the nationalist forces to
accommodate the demands of the Islamists-Hamas and Islamic Jihad-for the
sake of maintaining national unity, internal political consensus and popular
support. Third was the attempt by the Islamists to normalize their relationship
with the PA without conceding to the PA's political conditions.
"Compromise," for the PA, meant remaining silent on calls for
international protection, the application of the Geneva Conventions, human
rights, and cooperation with the Israeli peace movement, all of which the
Islamists reject. For the nationalist factions, compromise meant bringing the
Islamists into an institutional alliance of sorts in order to preclude the formation
of parallel Islamist institutions and strike forces, which happened during the first
Intifada. For the Islamists, compromise was cooperating with the nationalist
forces in a military campaign against the occupation-in short, coordination in
the field but not in politics. (Hamas has never officially recognized nor totally
rejected the PA.) The establishment of the National and Islamic Forces ("NIF"
early in the Intifada was one practical expression of this cooperation. The NIF is
a broad coalition of fourteen political factions and civic organizations whose
mandate is coordination of the uprising. Because the PA rejects the NIF's
supervisory role, the factions maintain that they are not bound by NIF decisions,
which has limited the NIF's effectiveness. However, and despite the fact that
neither side wants a formal partnership with the other, the Islamists have, in
effect, been granted veto power in political decision-making, which is
unprecedented in the history of the Palestinian national movement.
The result has been uneven and tendentious. While there have been several
examples of cooperation and coordination-for example, the PA's release of
Islamic activists from jail, Hamas's support of Arafat during the siege of his
compound, and ceasefire agreements between Hamas and the PA-tensions
remain high and conflicts intense. For example, in the absence of a common
political program (itself emerging from Arafat's failure to institutionalize a
political relationship between the Authority and the factions and provide them
with a viable decisionmaking role), factions compete and undermine each other,
22
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contributing to greater organizational chaos within the domestic political
environment. And while the relationship between the PA and the nationalist and
Islamist factions is a complex one defying simplistic notions of strategic control
or open opposition, the PA cannot and will not exercise real authority over
those factions in the absence of meaningful political prospects.23 (In fact, it was
the common opposition of both Arafat and the Islamists to Prime Minister
Mahmoud Abbas and his perceived political mission-that is, to implement the
American Road Map for Peace-that ultimately undermined him.) Within this
maelstrom, Hamas and other militant factions conduct suicide bombing attacks
in Israeli cities in opposition to official PA policy for which the Authority is
rightly or wrongly held accountable, and to which Israel responds with
devastating results.
Furthermore, as the PA grows weaker, Hamas is able to weaken it even
further; a significant part of the Hamas leadership believes--despite Israel's
assassination of several of its top officials during 2003 and 2004-that Hamas is
in a position to fill any vacuum created by the destruction of the PA or perhaps
displace it altogether. While it is impossible to predict whether this will occur, it
is clear that Hamas's role has become increasingly important. As early as
September 2002, for example, before Israel's siege of Arafat's compound later
that month, the US had indirect contacts with senior Hamas officials. The US
apparently promised them that, in exchange for their agreement to become a
part of a secular, democratic unity government in a new Palestinian state (a
discussion that Hamas was already conducting with Fateh, and which no doubt
contributed to the six-week lull in suicide bombings in 200224), the US would
pressure Israeli officials to end their policy of targeted assassinations and arrests
of Hamas officials. The US envoy engaged in the "talks" indicated that while he
could not guarantee Israeli acceptance, the US welcomed Hamas's decision to
become "a legitimate part of the political process., 25 It was also clear that the US
were
officials
Hamas
Reportedly,
talks.
Hamas-Fateh
endorsed
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pleased by these signals and by indications that the US would welcome Hamas's
political participation. 26 A senior US diplomat put it this way:
There is a difference between Hamas and, say, the Iranian mullahs. The one
tradition is nationalist and revolutionary, the other is clerical and religious.
We know the difference. We know who the honest actors are. We don't
happen to like Hamas tactics, but we know there's a world of difference
27
between what they want and what, say, Mullah Omar wants.

C. ISRAELI POLICY AND THE ISLAMIST OPPOSITION
The US-Hamas contacts, of which Israel was fully aware, ended when the
Israeli army arrested a moderate Hamas official in Ramallah on September 9,
2002. Hamas interpreted the incident as a deliberate attempt by the Sharon
government to undermine its exchange with the Americans. This was followed
just a few days later by an Israeli attack in Rafah, which killed nine Palestinians,
many of whom were civilians. On September 19, two Hamas bombs exploded in
Tel Aviv. Israel's siege of the presidential compound in Ramallah followed.
Under US pressure, Sharon ordered an end to the siege soon thereafter.
There are other examples of Hamas-PA ceasefires undermined by Israeli
attacks. The assassination of Mahmud Abu Hanud, a key Hamas figure, in
November 2001, was interpreted by Alex Fishman, the security commentator
for the right-of-center Yediot Aharonot, Israel's largest mass circulation
newspaper, as follows:
Whoever gave the green light to this act of liquidation knew full well that he
is thereby shattering in one blow the gendeman's agreement between
Hamas and the Palestinian Authority; under that agreement, Hamas was to
avoid in the near future suicide bombings inside the Green Line, of the kind
perpetrated at the Dolphinarium [discotheque in Tel-Aviv].
Such an agreement did exist, even if neither the PA nor Hamas would
admit it in public. It is a fact that, while the security services did accumulate
repeated warnings of planned Hamas terrorist attacks within the Green
Line, these did not materialize. That cannot be attributed solely to the
Shabak's impressive success in intercepting the suicide bombers and their
controllers. Rather, the respective leaderships of the PA and Hamas came to
the understanding that it would be better not to play into Israel's hands by
mass attacks on its population centres.
This understanding was, however, shattered by the assassination the
day before yesterday-and whoever decided upon the liquidation of Abu
Hunud knew in advance that that would be the price. The subject was
extensively discussed both by Israel's military echelon and its political one,
before it was decided to carry out the liquidation. 28
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On December 1 and 2 came the Hamas bombings in Jersualem's Zion
Square and on a bus in Haifa. Twenty-five Israelis were killed, many of them
children.
In July 2002, with the help of European diplomats, the Fateh tan#Mi9 -as
opposed to the PA-and Hamas had reached an understanding that all attacks
inside Israel would stop and they were preparing to issue a formal statement to
that effect on July 22. Hamas's spiritual leader and founder, Sheikh Ahmed
Yassin, announced publicly that Hamas was considering a ceasefire if Israel
withdrew its troops from Palestinian population centers they recently had
reoccupied. Just ninety minutes before the proclamation was to be announced,
the Israeli authorities bombed the Gaza apartment of Hamas military wing
leader Sheikh Salah Shehada, killing him and sixteen others, including eleven
children. More Hamas suicide bombings in Israel then followed. On November
26, 2002, Israeli helicopters targeted and killed the commanders of the military
wings of Hamas and the Al Aqsa Brigades in the Jenin refugee camp. Both
factions promised to carry out large-scale attacks inside Israel in revenge.
By now, the pattern is well known and firmly established: every Israeli
assassination of a Palestinian-and there have been 150 since 20003° -produces
a terror attack inside Israel, and scores of Israelis have been killed as a result.
The killing in August 2003 of Hamis Abu-Salam and Faiz A-Sadar, two Hamas
officials, at the Askar refugee camp in Nablus, for example, led to the two
suicide attacks at Ariel and Rosh Ha'ayin soon thereafter, breaking a ceasefire
that had been in effect since June 29, 2003.31 According to Gideon Levy, a writer
for the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz :
Much as Israel claims that the Palestinians are violating the truce and
regrouping in order to perpetrate savage acts of terror, its pleading can't
alter the facts: up until Israel renewed its assassinations campaign, there
were no suicide bombings, and the two attacks [at Ariel and Rosh Ha'ayin]
last week were direct responses to the Askar refugee camp slayings. 32
It seems obvious, to some analysts at least, that by engaging in such
provocative acts-which clearly do little if anything to protect the security of
Israel's citizens and do a great deal to jeopardize it-the Sharon government is
deliberately trying to undermine the diplomatic process, and thereby ensure its
continued occupation of Palestinian land and resources.
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In the words of a former senior European security official, the ceasefire
failed due to:
continued Israeli assassinations and killings that completely undermined
genuine attempts at de-escalation. Israel's response created a self-fulfilling
prophecy. They had the expectation of failure and in effect guaranteed
it .... [T]here were continued provocations, a dismissive attitude, no
confidence-building measures, and unhelpful statements. Israel's Minister of
Defence would publicly claim that Hamas is re-grouping and that [the] IDF
must prepare for a massive attack. Hamas begins to prepare for this
eventuality. To Israel this is proof of its original thesis, a casus belli. It attacks,
Hamas responds, the IDF feels vindicated and the budna [ceasefire] is
history. 33
Put in more poignant terms, one Israeli observer wrote, "[t]hey slay
Palestinians and expect them to exercise restraint. '3 4 More attacks followed
including the killing by Hamas of twenty-two Israelis in Jerusalem on August 19,
2003. On September 6, 2003, the European Union gave in to American and
British pressure and adopted a resolution blacklisting the political wing of
Hamas, declaring it a terrorist organization. The Israeli government immediately
responded with the attempted assassination in Gaza of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin,
the spiritual leader of Hamas. In March 2004, the Israeli government succeeded
in assassinating Sheikh Yassin as he was leaving a mosque after prayers.
Suicide bombings are horrific and criminal, but what do the examples
above say about the policies of the Sharon government? The argument has been
made that Sharon's policies aim to undermine any possibility of a political
settlement, which would involve compromises his government is unwilling to
make, preferring instead a decisive military victory and long-term interim
arrangements dictated by Israel, no matter the cost. That is, rather than draw
Hamas into a political role that would "give the Islamists a more proportional
share of power in exchange for their agreement to a modified political
approach," 35 and thereby encourage an internal political settlement among
Palestinian factions (particularly with Fateh)-something the Sharon
government vehemently opposes because it would strengthen the Palestinian
position-the Israeli government is attempting to destroy the Islamists through
military means, and foster continued internal political dissension and internecine
conflict.
Hence, Israel will most likely reject as a deceptive smokescreen Hamas's
January 2004 proposal of a ten-year truce in exchange for Israel's withdrawal
from the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem, and the establishment of a Palestinian
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state, a proposal that has several historical precedents.36 With this proposal
Hamas has made it clear it is not recognizing Israel or necessarily calling for an
end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Yet, given Hamas's great sensitivity to
public opinion, the proposal may again signal the beginning of a (political) shift
within the organization away from the use of violence, which has accomplished
little and has exacted enormous social costs. This shift, if real, repeats the pattern
toward social and political accommodation that characterized Hamas's behavior
during the Oslo period. This change also represents an attempt by Hamas to
strengthen and secure its leadership position, perhaps in coordination with some
younger Fateh cadres, among a population that is economically devastated and
politically adrift, finally displacing the old Arafatist elite, and toppling the older
guard of Fateh, already fragmented organizationally and geographically. 37 Now,
as before (during Oslo), Hamas's shift also derives from Israel's success at
weakening its military capacity through its assassination campaign and frequent
raids into Palestinian towns and localities.
Some analysts believe that Hamas is at a crossroads:
[K]ey leaders, determined not to be equated with Bin Laden's nihilistic
terrorism and convinced they have gained considerable political strength at
home, allegedly see the need for a strategic transformation that will give
them the legitimacy in regional and international eyes, and given the
appropriate environment, may be able to achieve it.38
The extra-judicial killing by Israel of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Hamas's
founder and spiritual leader on March 22, 2004, may have altered the political
equation in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza dramatically. Yassin, greatly revered
inside and outside the West Bank and Gaza, was a unifying, moderating force
within Hamas, particularly on its military wing. Because of his stature and clout
he was able to overcome disputes between Hamas's internal and external
leaderships over halting military operations against Israel in exchange for an
Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories and the establishment of a
Palestinian state, something Yassin had proposed to the Israeli government on
more than one occasion.
Yassin's assassination will no doubt strengthen the radicals within Hamas
and undermine the moderates, a dynamic that may also find expression
throughout the Arab and Muslim world. Sharon's decision to assassinate Yassin
has many dimensions, including the desire to foment Palestinian radicalism in a
manner that would justify Israel's continued brutal response against Palestinian
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terrorism and the continued control of Palestinian lands, and so preclude the
possibility of a political settlement. Furthermore, with Yassin's killing, the
Sharon government may have found the most effective way to finally dispose of
the Palestinian Authority, which Palestinians have long regarded as morally and
politically bankrupt, corrupt and collaborationist.
This points to another argument regarding Israel's policies toward the
Islamist opposition. Some analysts maintain that while Hamas leaders are being
targeted and their political overtures rejected, Israel is simultaneously pursuing
its old strategy of promoting Hamas over the secular nationalist factions as a way
of insuring the ultimate demise of the Palestinian Authority, and as an effort to
extinguish Palestinian nationalism once and for all. In fact, some allies of Arafat
have, in the past, accused Hamas of being in a tacit alliance with Israel. In so
doing, the argument continues, Israel creates a justification for maintaining the
occupation since it will deal with Palestinians only as militant radicals and not on
the basis of national rights or as a legitimate part of a political process. But then
what?
Prior to Yassin's assassination, it should also be noted that some Israeli
security officials argued that their government would ultimately have to deal with
Hamas. "The IDF today understands that Hamas is also a movement like
Hezbollah or... Shas [Israel's Orthodox Sephardic party] ...[that is, more than
just a paramilitary organization], and no one really believes that it can be
destroyed."3 9 According to a former senior Israeli security official:
There is a school that accepts that the Hamas is a political and social
movement and wants to engage them in a political process. It sees Jordan
and its co-option of the Islamic movement as the model to emulate. Their
argument is that Hamas cannot be made to disappear. Israel is at present
studying the Jordanian model closely. 4°
With Yassin's killing, this possibility may now be dead.
D. ISLAMIC SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
The reclaimed dominance of the Islamic political and military sectors has
not eclipsed the importance or the role of their social counterpart. The
economic conditions in the West Bank and Gaza are dire, with unemployment
and poverty rates standing on average at 30 percent and 60 percent respectively.
Additionally, Israel is constructing a 400-mile barrier throughout the West Bank
that will deepen Palestine's economic misery by surrounding the West Bank and
dividing it into two non-contiguous cantons. These circumstances have eroded
the capacity of the PA to deliver basic social services, so Islamic social
organizations have become an increasingly important part of the Palestinian
39
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social welfare system. Now, as during the Oslo period, they are providing
services the PA is unable to provide and doing so with the tacit, if not explicit,
support of the authorities. Indeed, the periodic closing of Islamic charities and
other social institutions for political reasons is often temporary because without
their services a vacuum would result, which the PA is clearly incapable of filling,
further strengthening the presence of Islamic organizations in Palestinians' daily
life. 4' Furthermore, Islamic civic institutions, unlike their secular counterpartswhich are also engaged in activities such as human rights, advocacy, and political
reform that highlight the PA's deficiencies--do not challenge the PA's work or
methods but rather complement them.
In contrast to the PA, however, there has been an international effort after
September 11 to restrict the activities of the Islamic social sector because it
contributes to the political appeal and growth of Hamas. (Interestingly, it is
unclear at this point whether Islamic social organizations in the re-occupied
West Bank in particular are being closed or dismantled by Israel for the same
reason, or whether Israel is allowing these institutions to function as part of its
strategy of eliminating a secular alternative.) Another important question
concerns internal relations between the Islamic social and political sectors. If
Hamas assumes a greater political role after the PA's demise, which seems more
likely after Yassin's death-especially in the Gaza Strip-how are Hamas and
the Islamic institutions preparing for this shift, and how would the role of
Islamic social organizations change should such a shift occur?
III. SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

While an Islamist alternative still remains unacceptable to many or most
Palestinians, it is clear that the Islamists, notably Hamas, have increasingly
become a vocal and institutionalized part of the Palestinian political landscape;
as such, they will need to be incorporated into any future political
arrangement-not marginalized. What is also clear is that, despite its militant
extremism, the Islamist movement has shown that it can be pragmatic. While
there remain many good reasons to question Hamas, there are also as many
reasons to test them. Indeed, the alternative-open and continued
confrontation-will be worse, bringing certain disaster to Israelis and
Palestinians.
Although it is still too early to say definitively, it appears that an Islamist
base may in fact be taking shape among the population, which, if true, marks a
striking departure from the pre-Intifada period. This refers to a popular base
41
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that is mobilized around an Islamist ideology, which is distinct from the large
and ever increasing popular base of support that Hamas now commands. This is
due not only to extreme and unabated economic and social decline but to the
virtual destruction of a viable secular political alternative. Because of the political
vacuum that has subsequently emerged, and the absence of meaningful nonviolent options, it appears that the Islamists are increasingly being judged not by
the socioeconomic work they perform-although essential and valued-but by
the political ideology they espouse. This, too, represents another critical
departure from the Oslo period, and it is occurring not because Palestinians
have become extremists (religious or otherwise) but because they have become
desperate.
The political transformations of Hamas and the Islamic movement
generally derive from a combination of internal and external factors, which
could only be touched upon here. Insofar as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is
concerned, the greatest threat to peace is not extremism-Islamic or secularbut the context that produces and nurtures it: occupation. The fundamental
problem among Palestinians is that the majority of people are disenfranchised
and poor, having no power, access, or future. Radical Islam emerged not
because people were opposed to political and economic change but because they
were continuously denied it.
It is ironic that the re-ascent of political and militant Islam in historically
secular Palestine is taking place at a time when the notion of an Islamic state is
waning in other national contexts, notably Iran and Turkey, where the internal
struggle to dissociate theocracy from the state is intensifying. Palestinians have
always been a secular people seeking their political rights and national liberation,
but this could change if their misery deepens and their prospects for the future
vanish.
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